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Abstract. We introduce Meta-F?, a tactics and metaprogramming frame-
work for the F? program verifier. The main novelty of Meta-F? is allowing
the use of tactics and metaprogramming to discharge assertions not solv-
able by SMT, or to just simplify them into well-behaved SMT fragments.
Plus, Meta-F? can be used to generate verified code automatically.
Meta-F? is implemented as an F? effect, which, given the powerful ef-
fect system of F?, heavily increases code reuse and even enables the
lightweight verification of metaprograms. Metaprograms can be either
interpreted, or compiled to efficient native code that can be dynamically
loaded into the F? type-checker and can interoperate with interpreted
code. Evaluation on realistic case studies shows that Meta-F? provides
substantial gains in proof development, efficiency, and robustness.
1 Introduction
Scripting proofs using tactics and metaprogramming has a long tradition in in-
teractive theorem provers (ITPs), starting with Milner’s Edinburgh LCF [38]. In
this lineage, properties of pure programs are specified in expressive higher-order
(and often dependently typed) logics, and proofs are conducted using various
imperative programming languages, starting originally with ML.
Along a different axis, program verifiers like Dafny [48], VCC [24], Why3 [34],
and Liquid Haskell [60] target both pure and effectful programs, with side-effects
ranging from divergence to concurrency, but provide relatively weak logics for
specification (e.g., first-order logic with a few selected theories like linear arith-
metic). They work primarily by computing verification conditions (VCs) from
programs, usually relying on annotations such as pre- and postconditions, and
encoding them to automated theorem provers (ATPs) such as satisfiability mod-
ulo theories (SMT) solvers, often providing excellent automation.
These two sub-fields have influenced one another, though the situation is
somewhat asymmetric. On the one hand, most interactive provers have gained
support for exploiting SMT solvers or other ATPs, providing push-button au-
tomation for certain kinds of assertions [27, 32, 44, 45, 55]. On the other hand,
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2 Martínez et al.
recognizing the importance of interactive proofs, Why3 [34] interfaces with ITPs
like Coq. However, working over proof obligations translated fromWhy3 requires
users to be familiar not only with both these systems, but also with the specifics
of the translation. And beyond Why3 and the tools based on it [26], no other
SMT-based program verifiers have full-fledged support for interactive proving,
leading to several downsides:
Limits to expressiveness The expressiveness of program verifiers can be lim-
ited by the ATP used. When dealing with theories that are undecidable and
difficult to automate (e.g., non-linear arithmetic or separation logic), proofs in
ATP-based systems may become impossible or, at best, extremely tedious.
Boilerplate To work around this lack of automation, programmers have to
construct detailed proofs by hand, often repeating many tedious yet error-prone
steps, so as to provide hints to the underlying solver to discover the proof.
In contrast, ITPs with metaprogramming facilities excel at expressing domain-
specific automation to complete such tedious proofs.
Implicit proof context In most program verifiers, the logical context of a proof
is implicit in the program text and depends on the control flow and the pre- and
postconditions of preceding computations. Unlike in interactive proof assistants,
programmers have no explicit access, neither visual nor programmatic, to this
context, making proof structuring and exploration extremely difficult.
In direct response to these drawbacks, we seek a system that successfully
combines the convenience of an automated program verifier for the common case,
while seamlessly transitioning to an interactive proving experience for those parts
of a proof that are hard to automate. Towards this end, we propose Meta-F?, a
tactics and metaprogramming framework for the F? [1, 59] program verifier.
Highlights and Contributions of Meta-F?
F? has historically been more deeply rooted as an SMT-based program verifier.
Until now, F? discharged VCs exclusively by calling an SMT solver (usually
Z3 [29]), providing good automation for many common program verification
tasks, but also exhibiting the drawbacks discussed above.
Meta-F? is a framework that allows F? users to manipulate VCs using tactics.
More generally, it supports metaprogramming, allowing programmers to script
the construction of programs, by manipulating their syntax and customizing the
way they are type-checked. This allows programmers to (1) implement custom
procedures for manipulating VCs; (2) eliminate boilerplate in proofs and pro-
grams; and (3) to inspect the proof state visually and to manipulate it program-
matically, addressing the drawbacks discussed above. SMT still plays a central
role in Meta-F?: a typical usage involves implementing tactics to transform VCs,
so as to bring them into theories well-supported by SMT, without needing to
(re)implement full decision procedures. Further, the generality of Meta-F? allows
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implementing non-trivial language extensions (e.g., typeclass resolution) entirely
as metaprogramming libraries, without changes to the F? type-checker.
The technical contributions of our work include the following:
“Meta-” is just an effect (§3.1) Meta-F? is implemented using F?’s extensible
effect system, which keeps programs and metaprograms properly isolated. Be-
ing first-class F? programs, metaprograms are typed, call-by-value, direct-style,
higher-order functional programs, much like the original ML. Further, metapro-
grams can be themselves verified (to a degree, see §3.4) and metaprogrammed.
Reconciling tactics with VC generation (§4.2) In program verifiers the
programmer often guides the solver towards the proof by supplying intermediate
assertions. Meta-F? retains this style, but additionally allows assertions to be
solved by tactics. To this end, a contribution of our work is extracting, from a
VC, a proof state encompassing all relevant hypotheses, including those implicit
in the program text.
Executing metaprograms efficiently (§5) Metaprograms are executed dur-
ing type-checking. As a baseline, they can be interpreted using F?’s existing (but
slow) abstract machine for term normalization, or a faster normalizer based on
normalization by evaluation (NbE) [11, 17]. For much faster execution speed,
metaprograms can also be run natively. This is achieved by combining the ex-
isting extraction mechanism of F? to OCaml with a new framework for safely
extending the F? type-checker with such native code.
Examples (§2) and evaluation (§6) We evaluate Meta-F? on several case
studies. First, we present a functional correctness proof for the Poly1305 message
authentication code (MAC) [12], using a novel combination of proofs by reflection
for dealing with non-linear arithmetic and SMT solving for linear arithmetic. We
measure a clear gain in proof robustness: SMT-only proofs succeed only rarely
(for reasonable timeouts), whereas our tactic+SMT proof is concise, never fails,
and is faster. Next, we demonstrate an improvement in expressiveness, by de-
veloping a small library for proofs of heap-manipulating programs in separation
logic, which was previously out-of-scope for F?. Finally, we illustrate the ability
to automatically construct verified effectful programs, by introducing a library
for metaprogramming verified low-level parsers and serializers with applications
to network programming, where verification is accelerated by processing the VC
with tactics, and by programmatically tweaking the SMT context.
We conclude that tactics and metaprogramming can be prosperously com-
bined with VC generation and SMT solving to build verified programs with
better, more scalable, and more robust automation.
The full version of this paper, including appendices, can be found online in
https://www.fstar-lang.org/papers/metafstar.
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2 Meta-F? by Example
F? is a general-purpose programming language aimed at program verification. It
puts together the automation of an SMT-backed deductive verification tool with
the expressive power of a language with full-spectrum dependent types. Briefly, it
is a functional, higher-order, effectful, dependently typed language, with syntax
loosely based on OCaml. F? supports refinement types and Hoare-style specifi-
cations, computing VCs of computations via a type-level weakest precondition
(WP) calculus packed within Dijkstra monads [58]. F?’s effect system is also
user-extensible [1]. Using it, one can model or embed imperative programming
in styles ranging from ML to C [56] and assembly [36]. After verification, F? pro-
grams can be extracted to efficient OCaml or F# code. A first-order fragment
of F?, called Low?, can also be extracted to C via the KreMLin compiler [56].
This paper introduces Meta-F?, a metaprogramming framework for F? that
allows users to safely customize and extend F? in many ways. For instance,
Meta-F? can be used to preprocess or solve proof obligations; synthesize F? ex-
pressions; generate top-level definitions; and resolve implicit arguments in user-
defined ways, enabling non-trivial extensions. This paper primarily discusses the
first two features. Technically, none of these features deeply increase the expres-
sive power of F?, since one could manually program in F? terms that can now be
metaprogrammed. However, as we will see shortly, manually programming terms
and their proofs can be so prohibitively costly as to be practically infeasible.
Meta-F? is similar to other tactic frameworks, such as Coq’s [30] or Lean’s [31],
in presenting a set of goals to the programmer, providing commands to break
them down, allowing to inspect and build abstract syntax, etc. In this paper, we
mostly detail the characteristics where Meta-F? differs from other engines.
This section presents Meta-F? informally, displaying its usage through case
studies. We present any necessary F? background as needed.
2.1 Tactics for Individual Assertions and Partial Canonicalization
Non-linear arithmetic reasoning is crucially needed for the verification of op-
timized, low-level cryptographic primitives [19, 65], an important use case for
F? [14] and other verification frameworks, including those that rely on SMT solv-
ing alone (e.g., Dafny [48]) as well as those that rely exclusively on tactic-based
proofs (e.g., FiatCrypto [33]). While both styles have demonstrated significant
successes, we make a case for a middle ground, leveraging the SMT solver for
the parts of a VC where it is effective, and using tactics only where it is not.
We focus on Poly1305 [12], a widely-used cryptographic MAC that computes
a series of integer multiplications and additions modulo a large prime number
p = 2130−5. Implementations of the Poly1305 multiplication and mod operations
are carefully hand-optimized to represent 130-bit numbers in terms of smaller
32-bit or 64-bit registers, using clever tricks; proving their correctness requires
reasoning about long sequences of additions and multiplications.
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Previously: Guiding SMT solvers by manually applying lemmas Prior
proofs of correctness of Poly1305 and other cryptographic primitives using SMT-
based program verifiers, including F? [65] and Dafny [19], use a combination of
SMT automation and manual application of lemmas. On the plus side, SMT
solvers are excellent at linear arithmetic, so these proofs delegate all associativity-
commutativity (AC) reasoning about addition to SMT. Non-linear arithmetic in
SMT solvers, even just AC-rewriting and distributivity, are, however, inefficient
and unreliable—so much so that the prior efforts above (and other works too [41,
42]) simply turn off support for non-linear arithmetic in the solver, in order not
to degrade verification performance across the board due to poor interaction of
theories. Instead, users need to explicitly invoke lemmas.1
For instance, here is a statement and proof of a lemma about Poly1305 in F?.
The property and its proof do not really matter; the lines marked “(∗argh! ∗)”
do. In this particular proof, working around the solver’s inability to effectively
reason about non-linear arithmetic, the programmer has spelled out basic facts
about distributivity of multiplication and addition, by calling the library lemma
distributivity_add_right, in order to guide the solver towards the proof. (Below,
p44 and p88 represent 244 and 288 respectively)
let lemma_carry_limb_unrolled (a0 a1 a2 : nat) : Lemma (ensures (
a0 % p44 + p44 ∗ ((a1 + a0 / p44) % p44) + p88 ∗ (a2 + ((a1 + a0 / p44) / p44))
== a0 + p44 ∗ a1 + p88 ∗ a2)) =
let z = a0 % p44 + p44 ∗ ((a1 + a0 / p44) % p44)
+ p88 ∗ (a2 + ((a1 + a0 / p44) / p44)) in
distributivity_add_right p88 a2 ((a1 + a0 / p44) / p44); (∗ argh! ∗)
pow2_plus 44 44;
lemma_div_mod (a1 + a0 / p44) p44;
distributivity_add_right p44 ((a1 + a0 / p44) % p44)
(p44 ∗ ((a1 + a0 / p44) / p44)); (∗ argh! ∗)
assert (p44 ∗ ((a1 + a0 / p44) % p44) + p88 ∗ ((a1 + a0 / p44) / p44)
== p44 ∗ (a1 + a0 / p44) );
distributivity_add_right p44 a1 (a0 / p44); (∗ argh! ∗)
lemma_div_mod a0 p44
Even at this relatively small scale, needing to explicitly instantiate the distribu-
tivity lemma is verbose and error prone. Even worse, the user is blind while
doing so: the program text does not display the current set of available facts nor
the final goal. Proofs at this level of abstraction are painfully detailed in some
aspects, yet also heavily reliant on the SMT solver to fill in the aspects of the
proof that are missing.
Given enough time, the solver can sometimes find a proof without the addi-
tional hints, but this is usually rare and dependent on context, and almost never
robust. In this particular example we find by varying Z3’s random seed that, in
1 Lemma (requires pre) (ensures post) is F? notation for the type of a computation
proving pre =⇒ post—we omit pre when it is trivial. In F?’s standard library, math
lemmas are proved using SMT with little or no interactions between problematic
theory combinations. These lemmas can then be explicitly invoked in larger contexts,
and are deleted during extraction.
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an isolated setting, the lemma is proven automatically about 32% of the time.
The numbers are much worse for more complex proofs, and where the context
contains many facts, making this style quickly spiral out of control. For example,
a proof of one of the main lemmas in Poly1305, poly_multiply, requires 41 steps
of rewriting for associativity-commutativity of multiplication, and distributivity
of addition and multiplication—making the proof much too long to show here.
SMT and tactics in Meta-F? The listing below shows the statement and
proof of poly_multiply in Meta-F?, of which the lemma above was previously only
a small part. Again, the specific property proven is not particularly relevant to
our discussion. But, this time, the proof contains just two steps.
let poly_multiply (n p r h r0 r1 h0 h1 h2 s1 d0 d1 d2 h1 h2 hh : int) : Lemma
(requires p > 0 ∧ r1 ≥ 0 ∧ n > 0 ∧ 4 ∗ (n ∗ n) == p + 5 ∧ r == r1 ∗ n + r0 ∧
h == h2 ∗ (n ∗ n) + h1 ∗ n + h0 ∧ s1 == r1 + (r1 / 4) ∧ r1 % 4 == 0 ∧
d0 == h0 ∗ r0 + h1 ∗ s1 ∧ d1 == h0 ∗ r1 + h1 ∗ r0 + h2 ∗ s1 ∧
d2 == h2 ∗ r0 ∧ hh == d2 ∗ (n ∗ n) + d1 ∗ n + d0)
(ensures (h ∗ r) % p == hh % p) =
let r14 = r1 / 4 in
let h_r_expand = (h2 ∗ (n ∗ n) + h1 ∗ n + h0) ∗ ((r14 ∗ 4) ∗ n + r0) in
let hh_expand = (h2 ∗ r0) ∗ (n ∗ n) + (h0 ∗ (r14 ∗ 4) + h1 ∗ r0
+ h2 ∗ (5 ∗ r14)) ∗ n + (h0 ∗ r0 + h1 ∗ (5 ∗ r14)) in
let b = (h2 ∗ n + h1) ∗ r14 in
modulo_addition_lemma hh_expand p b;
assert (h_r_expand == hh_expand + b ∗ (n ∗ n ∗ 4 + (−5)))
by (canon_semiring int_csr) (∗ Proof of this step by Meta-F∗ tactic ∗)
First, we call a single lemma about modular addition from F?’s standard
library. Then, we assert an equality annotated with a tactic (assert..by). In-
stead of encoding the assertion as-is to the SMT solver, it is preprocessed by
the canon_semiring tactic. The tactic is presented with the asserted equality as
its goal, in an environment containing not only all variables in scope but also
hypotheses for the precondition of poly_multiply and the postcondition of the
modulo_addition_lemma call (otherwise, the assertion could not be proven). The
tactic will then canonicalize the sides of the equality, but notably only “up to”
linear arithmetic conversions. Rather than fully canonicalizing the terms, the
tactic just rewrites them into a sum-of-products canonical form, leaving all the
remaining work to the SMT solver, which can then easily and robustly discharge
the goal using linear arithmetic only.
This tactic works over terms in the commutative semiring of integers (int_csr)
using proof-by-reflection [13, 21, 37, 39]. Internally, it is composed of a sim-
pler, also proof-by-reflection based tactic canon_monoid that works over monoids,
which is then “stacked” on itself to build canon_semiring. The basic idea of proof-
by-reflection is to reduce most of the proof burden to mechanical computation,
obtaining much more efficient proofs compared to repeatedly applying lemmas.
For canon_monoid, we begin with a type for monoids, a small AST representing
monoid values, and a denotation for expressions back into the monoid type.
type monoid (a:Type) = { unit : a; mult : (a → a → a); (∗ + monoid laws ... ∗) }
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type exp (a:Type) = | Unit : exp a | Var : a → exp a | Mult : exp a → exp a → exp a
(∗ Note on syntax: #a below denotes that a is an implicit argument ∗)
let rec denote (#a:Type) (m:monoid a) (e:exp a) : a =
match e with
| Unit →m.unit | Var x → x | Mult x y →m.mult (denote m x) (denote m y)
To canonicalize an exp, it is first converted to a list of operands (flatten) and then
reflected back to the monoid (mldenote). The process is proven correct, in the
particular case of equalities, by the monoid_reflect lemma.
val flatten : #a:Type → exp a → list a
val mldenote : #a:Type →monoid a → list a → a
let monoid_reflect (#a:Type) (m:monoid a) (e1 e2 : exp a)
: Lemma (requires (mldenote m (flatten e1) == mldenote m (flatten e2)))
(ensures (denote m e1 == denote m e2)) = ...
At this stage, if the goal is t1== t2, we require two monoidal expressions e1 and
e2 such that t1== denote m e1 and t2== denote m e2. They are constructed by
the tactic canon_monoid by inspecting the syntax of the goal, using Meta-F?’s
reflection capabilities (detailed ahead in §3.3). We have no way to prove once
and for all that the expressions built by canon_monoid correctly denote the terms,
but this fact can be proven automatically at each application of the tactic, by
simple unification. The tactic then applies the lemma monoid_reflect m e1e2, and
the goal is changed to mldenote m (flatten e1) == mldenote m (flatten e2). Finally,
by normalization, each side will be canonicalized by running flatten and mldenote.
The canon_semiring tactic follows a similar approach, and is similar to existing
reflective tactics for other proof assistants [10, 39], except that it only canoni-
calizes up to linear arithmetic, as explained above. The full VC for poly_multiply
contains many other facts, e.g., that p is non-zero so the division is well-defined
and that the postcondition does indeed hold. These obligations remain in a
“skeleton” VC that is also easily proven by Z3. This proof is much easier for the
programmer to write and much more robust, as detailed ahead in §6.1. The proof
of Poly1305’s other main lemma, poly_reduce, is also similarly well automated.
Tactic proofs without SMT Of course, one can verify poly_multiply in Coq,
following the same conceptual proof used in Meta-F?, but relying on tactics only.
Our proof (see Fig. 1 in the appendix) is 27 lines long, two of which involve the
use of Coq’s ring tactic (similar to our canon_semiring tactic) and omega tactic for
solving formulas in Presburger arithmetic. The remaining 25 lines include steps
to destruct the propositional structure of terms, rewrite by equalities, enriching
the context to enable automatic modulo rewriting (Coq does not fully automat-
ically recognize equality modulo p as an equivalence relation compatible with
arithmetic operators). While a mature proof assistant like Coq has libraries and
tools to ease this kind of manipulation, it can still be verbose.
In contrast, in Meta-F? all of these mundane parts of a proof are simply
dispatched to the SMT solver, which decides linear arithmetic efficiently, beyond
the quantifier-free Presburger fragment supported by tactics like omega, handles
congruence closure natively, etc.
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2.2 Tactics for Entire VCs and Separation Logic
A different way to invoke Meta-F? is over an entire VC. While the exact shape
of VCs is hard to predict, users with some experience can write tactics that find
and solve particular sub-assertions within a VC, or simply massage them into
shapes better suited for the SMT solver. We illustrate the idea on proofs for
heap-manipulating programs.
One verification method that has eluded F? until now is separation logic,
the main reason being that the pervasive “frame rule” requires instantiating
existentially quantified heap variables, which is a challenge for SMT solvers, and
simply too tedious for users. With Meta-F?, one can do better. We have written
a (proof-of-concept) embedding of separation logic and a tactic (sl_auto) that
performs heap frame inference automatically.
The approach we follow consists of designing the WP specifications for prim-
itive stateful actions so as to make their footprint syntactically evident. The
tactic then descends through VCs until it finds an existential for heaps aris-
ing from the frame rule. Then, by solving an equality between heap expressions
(which requires canonicalization, for which we use a variant of canon_monoid
targeting commutative monoids) the tactic finds the frames and instantiates
the existentials. Notably, as opposed to other tactic frameworks for separation
logic [5, 46, 50, 52], this is all our tactic does before dispatching to the SMT
solver, which can now be effective over the instantiated VC.
We now provide some detail on the framework. Below, ‘emp’ represents the
empty heap, ‘•’ is the separating conjunction and ‘r 7→ v’ is the heaplet with the
single reference r set to value v.2 Our development distinguishes between a “heap”
and its “memory” for technical reasons, but we will treat the two as equivalent
here. Further, defined is a predicate discriminating valid heaps (as in [53]), i.e.,
those built from separating conjunctions of actually disjoint heaps.
We first define the type of WPs and present the WP for the frame rule:
let pre = memory → prop (∗ predicate on initial heaps ∗)
let post a = a →memory → prop (∗ predicate on result values and final heaps ∗)
let wp a = post a → pre (∗ transformer from postconditions to preconditions ∗)
let frame_post (#a:Type) (p:post a) (m0:memory) : post a =
λx m1 → defined (m0 • m1) ∧ p x (m0 • m1)
let frame_wp (#a:Type) (wp:wp a) (post:post a) (m:memory) =
∃m0 m1. defined (m0 • m1) ∧ m == (m0 • m1) ∧ wp (frame_post post m1) m0
Intuitively, frame_post p m0 behaves as the postcondition p “framed” by m0, i.e.,
frame_post p m0 x m1 holds when the two heaps m0 and m1 are disjoint and p
holds over the result value x and the conjoined heaps. Then, frame_wp wp takes
a postcondition p and initial heap m, and requires that m can be split into disjoint
subheaps m0 (the footprint) and m1 (the frame), such that the postcondition p,
when properly framed, holds over the footprint.
2 This differs from the usual presentation where these three operators are heap predi-
cates instead of heaps.
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In order to provide specifications for primitive actions we start in small-
footprint style. For instance, below is the WP for reading a reference:
let read_wp (#a:Type) (r:ref a) = λpost m0 →∃x. m0 == r 7→ x ∧ post x m0
We then insert framing wrappers around such small-footprint WPs when expos-
ing the corresponding stateful actions to the programmer, e.g.,
val (!) : #a:Type → r:ref a →STATE a (λ p m → frame_wp (read_wp r) p m)
To verify code written in such style, we annotate the corresponding programs to
have their VCs processed by sl_auto. For instance, for the swap function below,
the tactic successfully finds the frames for the four occurrences of the frame
rule and greatly reduces the solver’s work. Even in this simple example, not
performing such instantiation would cause the solver to fail.
let swap_wp (r1 r2 : ref int) =
λp m →∃x y. m == (r1 7→ x • r2 7→ y) ∧ p () (r1 7→ y • r2 7→ x)
let swap (r1 r2 : ref int) : ST unit (swap_wp r1 r2) by (sl_auto ()) =
let x = !r1 in let y = !r2 in r1 := y; r2 := x
The sl_auto tactic: (1) uses syntax inspection to unfold and traverse the
goal until it reaches a frame_wp—say, the one for !r2; (2) inspects frame_wp’s
first explicit argument (here read_wp r2) to compute the references the current
command requires (here r2); (3) uses unification variables to build a memory
expression describing the required framing of input memory (here r2 7→ ?u1 • ?u2)
and instantiates the existentials of frame_wp with these unification variables;
(4) builds a goal that equates this memory expression with frame_wp’s third
argument (here r1 7→ x • r2 7→ y); and (5) uses a commutative monoids tactic
(similar to §2.1) with the heap algebra (emp, •) to canonicalize the equality and
sort the heaplets. Next, it can solve for the unification variables component-wise,
instantiating ?u1 to y and ?u2 to r1 7→ x, and then proceed to the next frame_wp.
In general, after frames are instantiated, the SMT solver can efficiently prove
the remaining assertions, such as the obligations about heap definedness. Thus,
with relatively little effort, Meta-F? brings an (albeit simple version of a) widely
used yet previously out-of-scope program logic (i.e., separation logic) into F?.
To the best of our knowledge, the ability to script separation logic into an SMT-
based program verifier, without any primitive support, is unique.
2.3 Metaprogramming Verified Low-level Parsers and Serializers
Above, we used Meta-F? to manipulate VCs for user-written code. Here, we
focus instead on generating verified code automatically. We loosely refer to the
previous setting as using “tactics”, and to the current one as “metaprogramming”.
In most ITPs, tactics and metaprogramming are not distinguished; however in
a program verifier like F?, where some proofs are not materialized at all (§4.1),
proving VCs of existing terms is distinct from generating new terms.
Metaprogramming in F? involves programmatically generating a (potentially
effectful) term (e.g., by constructing its syntax and instructing F? how to type-
check it) and processing any VCs that arise via tactics. When applicable (e.g.,
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when working in a domain-specific language), metaprogramming verified code
can substantially reduce, or even eliminate, the burden of manual proofs.
We illustrate this by automating the generation of parsers and serializers
from a type definition. Of course, this is a routine task in many mainstream
metaprogramming frameworks (e.g., Template Haskell, camlp4, etc). The novelty
here is that we produce imperative parsers and serializers extracted to C, with
proofs that they are memory safe, functionally correct, and mutually inverse.
This section is slightly simplified, more detail can be found in §A.
We proceed in several stages. First, we program a library of pure, high-level
parser and serializer combinators, proven to be (partial) mutual inverses of each
other. A parser for a type t is represented as a function possibly returning a t
along with the amount of input bytes consumed. The type of a serializer for a
given p:parser t contains a refinement3 stating that p is an inverse of the serializer.
A package is a dependent record of a parser and an associated serializer.
let parser t = seq byte → option (t ∗ nat)
let serializer #t (p:parser t) = f:(t → seq byte){∀ x. p (f x) == Some (x, length (f x))}
type package t = { p : parser t ; s : serializer p }
Basic combinators in the library include constructs for parsing and serializing
base values and pairs, such as the following:
val p_u8 : parse u8
val s_u8 : serializer p_u8
val p_pair : parser t1 → parser t2 → parser (t1 ∗ t2)
val s_pair : serializer p1 → serializer p2 → serializer (p_pair p1 p2)
Next, we define low-level versions of these combinators, which work over mu-
table arrays instead of byte sequences. These combinators are coded in the
Low? subset of F? (and so can be extracted to C) and are proven to both be
memory-safe and respect their high-level variants. The type for low-level parsers,
parser_impl (p:parser t), denotes an imperative function that reads from an array
of bytes and returns a t, behaving as the specificational parser p. Conversely, a
serializer_impl (s:serializer p) writes into an array of bytes, behaving as s.
Given such a library, we would like to build verified, mutually inverse, low-
level parsers and serializers for specific data formats. The task is mechanical,
yet overwhelmingly tedious by hand, with many auxiliary proof obligations of a
predictable structure: a perfect candidate for metaprogramming.
Deriving specifications from a type definition Consider the following F? type,
representing lists of exactly 18 pairs of bytes.
type sample = nlist 18 (u8 ∗ u8)
The first component of our metaprogram is gen_specs, which generates parser
and serializer specifications from a type definition.
let ps_sample : package sample = _ by (gen_specs (`sample))
3 F? syntax for refinements is x:t{φ }, denoting the type of all x of type t satisfying
φ .
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The syntax _ by τ is the way to call Meta-F? for code generation. Meta-F? will
run the metaprogram τ and, if successful, replace the underscore by the result.
In this case, the gen_specs (`sample) inspects the syntax of the sample type (§3.3)
and produces the package below (seq_p and seq_s are sequencing combinators):
let ps_sample = { p = p_nlist 18 (p_u8 `seq_p` p_u8)
; s = s_nlist 18 (s_u8 `seq_s` s_u8) }
Deriving low-level implementations that match specifications From this pair of
specifications, we can automatically generate Low? implementations for them:
let p_low : parser_impl ps_sample.p = _ by gen_parser_impl
let s_low : serializer_impl ps_sample.s = _ by gen_serializer_impl
which will produce the following low-level implementations:
let p_low = parse_nlist_impl 18ul (parse_u8_impl `seq_pi` parse_u8_impl)
let s_low = serialize_nlist_impl 18ul (serialize_u8_impl `seq_si` serialize_u8_impl)
For simple types like the one above, the generated code is fairly simple. However,
for more complex types, using the combinator library comes with non-trivial
proof obligations. For example, even for a simple enumeration, type color = Red
| Green, the parser specification is as follows:
parse_synth (parse_bounded_u8 2)
(λ x2 →mk_if_t (x2 = 0uy) (λ _ →Red) (λ _ →Green))
(λ x →match x with | Green → 1uy | Red → 0uy)
We represent Red with 0uy and Green with 1uy. The parser first parses a “bounded”
byte, with only two values. The parse_synth combinator then expects functions
between the bounded byte and the datatype being parsed (color), which must
be proven to be mutual inverses. This proof is conceptually easy, but for large
enumerations nested deep within the structure of other types, it is notoriously
hard for SMT solvers. Since the proof is inherently computational, a proof that
destructs the inductive type into its cases and then normalizes is much more
natural. With our metaprogram, we can produce the term and then discharge
these proof obligations with a tactic on the spot, eliminating them from the final
VC. We also explore simply tweaking the SMT context, again via a tactic, with
good results. A quantitative evaluation is provided in §6.2.
3 The Design of Meta-F?
Having caught a glimpse of the use cases for Meta-F?, we now turn to its design.
As usual in proof assistants (such as Coq, Lean and Idris), Meta-F? tactics
work over a set of goals and apply primitive actions to transform them, possibly
solving some goals and generating new goals in the process. Since this is standard,
we will focus the most on describing the aspects where Meta-F? differs from
other engines. We first describe how metaprograms are modelled as an effect
(§3.1) and their runtime model (§3.2). We then detail some of Meta-F?’s syntax
inspection and building capabilities (§3.3). Finally, we show how to perform some
(lightweight) verification of metaprograms (§3.4) within F?.
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3.1 An Effect for Metaprogramming
Meta-F? tactics are, at their core, programs that transform the “proof state”, i.e. a
set of goals needing to be solved. As in Lean [31] and Idris [23], we define a monad
combining exceptions and stateful computations over a proof state, along with
actions that can access internal components such as the type-checker. For this
we first introduce abstract types for the proof state, goals, terms, environments,
etc., together with functions to access them, some of them shown below.
type proofstate
type goal
type term
type env
val goals_of : proofstate → list goal
val goal_env : goal → env
val goal_type : goal → term
val goal_solution : goal → term
We can now define our metaprogramming monad: tac. It combines F?’s existing
effect for potential divergence (Div), with exceptions and stateful computations
over a proofstate. The definition of tac, shown below, is straightforward and given
in F?’s standard library. Then, we use F?’s effect extension capabilities [1] in
order to elevate the tac monad and its actions to an effect, dubbed TAC.
type error = exn ∗ proofstate (∗ error and proofstate at the time of failure ∗)
type result a = | Success : a → proofstate → result a | Failed : error → result a
let tac a = proofstate →Div (result a)
let t_return #a (x:a) = λps →Success x ps
let t_bind #a #b (m:tac a) (f:a → tac b) : tac b = λps → ... (∗ omitted, yet simple ∗)
let get () : tac proofstate = λps →Success ps ps
let raise #a (e:exn) : tac a = λps →Failed (e, ps)
new_effect { TAC with repr = tac ; return = t_return ; bind = t_bind
; get = get ; raise = raise }
The new_effect declaration introduces computation types of the form TAC t wp,
where t is the return type and wp a specification. However, until §3.4 we shall
only use the derived form Tac t, where the specification is trivial. These com-
putation types are distinct from their underlying monadic representation type
tac t—users cannot directly access the proof state except via the actions. The
simplest actions stem from the tac monad definition: get : unit →Tac proofstate
returns the current proof state and raise: exn →Tac α fails with the given excep-
tion4. Failures can be handled using catch : (unit →Tac α) →Tac (either exn α),
which resets the state on failure, including that of unification metavariables.
We emphasize two points here. First, there is no “set” action. This is to for-
bid metaprograms from arbitrarily replacing their proof state, which would be
unsound. Second, the argument to catch must be thunked, since in F? impure
un-suspended computations are evaluated before they are passed into functions.
The only aspect differentiating Tac from other user-defined effects is the exis-
tence of effect-specific primitive actions, which give access to the metaprogram-
ming engine proper. We list here but a few:
val trivial : unit →Tac unit val tc : term →Tac term val dump : string →Tac unit
4 We use greek letters α, β, ... to abbreviate universally quantified type variables.
Meta-F?: Proof Automation with SMT, Tactics, and Metaprograms 13
All of these are given an interpretation internally by Meta-F?. For instance, trivial
calls into F?’s logical simplifier to check whether the current goal is a trivial
proposition and discharges it if so, failing otherwise. The tc primitive queries the
type-checker to infer the type of a given term in the current environment (F?
types are a kind of terms, hence the codomain of tc is also term). This does not
change the proof state; its only purpose is to return useful information to the
calling metaprograms. Finally, dump outputs the current proof state to the user
in a pretty-printed format, in support of user interaction.
Having introduced the Tac effect and some basic actions, writing metapro-
grams is as straightforward as writing any other F? code. For instance, here are
two metaprogram combinators. The first one repeatedly calls its argument until
it fails, returning a list of all the successfully-returned values. The second one
behaves similarly, but folds the results with some provided folding function.
let rec repeat (τ : unit →Tac α) : Tac (list α) =
match catch τ with | Inl _ → [] | Inr x → x :: repeat τ
let repeat_fold f e τ = fold_left f e (repeat τ )
These two small combinators illustrate a few key points of Meta-F?. As for all
other F? effects, metaprograms are written in applicative style, without explicit
return, bind, or lift of computations (which are inserted under the hood). This
also works across different effects: repeat_fold can seamlessly combine the pure
fold_left from F?’s list library with a metaprogram like repeat. Metaprograms
are also type- and effect-inferred: while repeat_fold was not at all annotated, F?
infers the polymorphic type (β→α→β) →β→ (unit →Tac α) →Tac α for it.
It should be noted that, if lacking an effect extension feature, one could
embed metaprograms simply via the (properly abstracted) tac monad instead of
the Tac effect. It is just more convenient to use an effect, given we are working
within an effectful program verifier already. In what follows, with the exception
of §3.4 where we describe specifications for metaprograms, there is little reliance
on using an effect; so, the same ideas could be applied in other settings.
3.2 Executing Meta-F? Metaprograms
Running metaprograms involves three steps. First, they are reified [1] into their
underlying tac representation, i.e. as state-passing functions. User code cannot
reify metaprograms: only F? can do so when about to process a goal.
Second, the reified term is applied to an initial proof state, and then simply
evaluated according to F?’s dynamic semantics, for instance using F?’s existing
normalizer. For intensive applications, such as proofs by reflection, we provide
faster alternatives (§5). In order to perform this second step, the proof state,
which up until this moments exists only internally to F?, must be embedded
as a term, i.e., as abstract syntax. Here is where its abstraction pays off: since
metaprograms cannot interact with a proof state except through a limited inter-
face, it need not be deeply embedded as syntax. By simply wrapping the internal
proofstate into a new kind of “alien” term, and making the primitives aware of
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this wrapping, we can readily run the metaprogram that safely carries its alien
proof state around. This wrapping of proof states is a constant-time operation.
The third step is interpreting the primitives. They are realized by functions
of similar types implemented within the F? type-checker, but over an internal
tac monad and the concrete definitions for term, proofstate, etc. Hence, there is
a translation involved on every call and return, switching between embedded
representations and their concrete variants. Take dump, for example, with type
string →Tac unit. Its internal implementation, implemented within the F? type-
checker, has type string → proofstate → Div (result unit). When interpreting a call
to it, the interpreter must unembed the arguments (which are representations of
F? terms) into a concrete string and a concrete proofstate to pass to the internal
implementation of dump. The situation is symmetric for the return value of the
call, which must be embedded as a term.
3.3 Syntax Inspection, Generation, and Quotation
If metaprograms are to be reusable over different kinds of goals, they must be
able to reflect on the goals they are invoked to solve. Like any metaprogramming
system, Meta-F? offers a way to inspect and construct the syntax of F? terms.
Our representation of terms as an inductive type, and the variants of quotations,
are inspired by the ones in Idris [23] and Lean [31].
Inspecting syntax Internally, F? uses a locally-nameless representation [22]
with explicit, delayed substitutions. To shield metaprograms from some of this
internal bureaucracy, we expose a simplified view [62] of terms. Below we present
a few constructors from the term_view type:
val inspect : term →Tac term_view
val pack : term_view → term
type term_view =
| Tv_BVar : v:dbvar → term_view
| Tv_Var : v:name → term_view
| Tv_FVar : v:qname → term_view
| Tv_Abs : bv:binder → body:term → term_view
| Tv_App : hd:term → arg:term → term_view
...
The term_view type provides the “one-level-deep” structure of a term: metapro-
grams must call inspect to reveal the structure of the term, one constructor at
a time. The view exposes three kinds of variables: bound variables, Tv_BVar;
named local variables Tv_Var; and top-level fully qualified names, Tv_FVar.
Bound variables and local variables are distinguished since the internal abstract
syntax is locally nameless. For metaprogramming, it is usually simpler to use a
fully-named representation, so we provide inspect and pack functions that open
and close binders appropriately to maintain this invariant. Since opening binders
requires freshness, inspect has effect Tac.5 As generating large pieces of syntax
via the view easily becomes tedious, we also provide some ways of quoting terms:
5 We also provide functions inspect_ln, pack_ln which stay in a locally-nameless rep-
resentation and are thus pure, total functions.
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Static quotations A static quotation `e is just a shorthand for statically calling
the F? parser to convert e into the abstract syntax of F? terms above. For
instance, `(f 1 2) is equivalent to the following,
pack (Tv_App (pack (Tv_App (pack (Tv_FVar "f"))
(pack (Tv_Const (C_Int 1)))))
(pack (Tv_Const (C_Int 2))))
Dynamic quotations A second form of quotation is dquote: #a:Type → a →
Tac term, an effectful operation that is interpreted by F?’s normalizer during
metaprogram evaluation. It returns the syntax of its argument at the time
dquote e is evaluated. Evaluating dquote e substitutes all the free variables in
e with their current values in the execution environment, suspends further eval-
uation, and returns the abstract syntax of the resulting term. For instance,
evaluating (λx → dquote (x + 1)) 16 produces the abstract syntax of 16 + 1.
Anti-quotations Static quotations are useful for building big chunks of syntax
concisely, but they are of limited use if we cannot combine them with existing bits
of syntax. Subterms of a quotation are allowed to “escape” and be substituted by
arbitrary expressions. We use the syntax `#t to denote an antiquoted t, where t
must be an expression of type term in order for the quotation to be well-typed.
For example, `(1 + `#e) creates syntax for an addition where one operand is the
integer constant 1 and the other is the term represented by e.
Unquotation Finally, we provide an effectful operation, unquote: #a:Type →
t:term →Tac a, which takes a term representation t and an expected type for it a
(usually inferred from the context), and calls the F? type-checker to check and
elaborate the term representation into a well-typed term.
3.4 Specifying and Verifying Metaprograms
Since we model metaprograms as a particular kind of effectful program within
F?, which is a program verifier, a natural question to ask is whether F? can
specify and verify metaprograms. The answer is “yes, to a degree”.
To do so, we must use the WP calculus for the TAC effect: TAC-computations
are given computation types of the form TAC a wp, where a is the computa-
tion’s result type and wp is a weakest-precondition transformer of type tacwp a
= proofstate → (result a → prop) → prop. However, since WPs tend to not be very
intuitive, we first define two variants of the TAC effect: TacH in “Hoare-style” with
pre- and postconditions and Tac (which we have seen before), which only spec-
ifies the return type, but uses trivial pre- and postconditions. The requires and
ensures keywords below simply aid readability of pre- and postconditions—they
are identity functions.
effect TacH (a:Type) (pre : proofstate → prop) (post : proofstate → result a → prop) =
TAC a (λ ps post’ → pre ps ∧ (∀ r. post ps r =⇒ post’ r))
effect Tac (a:Type) = TacH a (requires (λ _ →>)) (ensures (λ _ _ →>))
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Previously, we only showed the simple type for the raise primitive, namely exn →
Tac α. In fact, in full detail and Hoare style, its type/specification is:
val raise : e:exn→ TacH α (requires (λ _ →>))
(ensures (λ ps r → r == Failed (e, ps)))
expressing that the primitive has no precondition, always fails with the provided
exception, and does not modify the proof state. From the specifications of the
primitives, and the automatically obtained Dijkstra monad, F? can already prove
interesting properties about metaprograms. We show a few simple examples.
The following metaprogram is accepted by F? as it can conclude, from the
type of raise, that the assertion is unreachable, and hence raise_flow can have a
trivial precondition (as Tac unit implies).
let raise_flow () : Tac unit = raise SomeExn; assert ⊥
For cur_goal_safe below, F? verifies that (given the precondition) the pattern
match is exhaustive. The postcondition is also asserting that the metaprogram
always succeeds without affecting the proof state, returning some unspecified
goal. Calls to cur_goal_safe must statically ensure that the goal list is not empty.
let cur_goal_safe () : TacH goal (requires (λ ps →¬(goals_of ps == [])))
(ensures (λ ps r →∃g. r == Success g ps)) =
match goals_of (get ()) with | g :: _ → g
Finally, the divide combinator below “splits” the goals of a proof state in two at a
given index n, and focuses a different metaprogram on each. It includes a runtime
check that the given n is non-negative, and raises an exception in the TAC effect
otherwise. Afterwards, the call to the (pure) List.splitAt function requires that
n be statically known to be non-negative, a fact which can be proven from the
specification for raise and the effect definition, which defines the control flow.
let divide (n:int) (tl : unit →Tac α) (tr : unit →Tac β) : Tac (α ∗ β) =
if n < 0 then raise NegativeN;
let gsl, gsr = List.splitAt n (goals ()) in ...
This enables a style of “lightweight” verification of metaprograms, where expres-
sive invariants about their state and control-flow can be encoded. The program-
mer can exploit dynamic checks (n < 0) and exceptions (raise) or static ones
(preconditions), or a mixture of them, as needed.
Due to type abstraction, though, the specifications of most primitives cannot
provide complete detail about their behavior, and deeper specifications (such as
ensuring a tactic will correctly solve a goal) cannot currently be proven, nor even
stated—to do so would require, at least, an internalization of the typing judgment
of F?. While this is an exciting possibility [4], we have for now only focused on
verifying basic safety properties of metaprograms, which helps users detect errors
early, and whose proofs the SMT can handle well. Although in principle, one can
also write tactics to discharge the proof obligations of metaprograms.
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4 Meta-F?, Formally
We now describe the trust assumptions for Meta-F? (§4.1) and then how we
reconcile tactics within a program verifier, where the exact shape of VCs is not
given, nor known a priori by the user (§4.2).
4.1 Correctness and Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
As in any proof assistant, tactics and metaprogramming would be rather use-
less if they allowed to “prove” invalid judgments—care must be taken to ensure
soundness. We begin with a taste of the specifics of F?’s static semantics, which
influence the trust model for Meta-F?, and then provide more detail on the TCB.
Proof irrelevance in F? The following two rules for introducing and eliminat-
ing refinement types are key in F?, as they form the basis of its proof irrelevance.
T-Refine
Γ ` e : t Γ |= φ[e/x]
Γ ` e : x : t{φ}
V-Refine
Γ ` e : x : t{φ}
Γ |= φ[e/x]
The  symbol represents F?’s validity judgment [1] which, at a high-level,
defines a proof-irrelevant, classical, higher-order logic. These validity hypotheses
are usually collected by the type-checker, and then encoded to the SMT solver
in bulk. Crucially, the irrelevance of validity is what permits efficient interaction
with SMT solvers, since reconstructing F? terms from SMT proofs is unneeded.
As evidenced in the rules, validity and typing are mutually recursive, and
therefore Meta-F? must also construct validity derivations. In the implementa-
tion, we model these validity goals as holes with a “squash” type [6, 54], where
squash φ= _:unit{φ }, i.e., a refinement of unit. Concretely, we model Γ  φ as
Γ ` ?u : squash φ using a unification variable. Meta-F? does not construct deep
solutions to squashed goals: if they are proven valid, the variable ?u is simply
solved by the unit value ‘()’. At any point, any such irrelevant goal can be sent
to the SMT solver. Relevant goals, on the other hand, cannot be sent to SMT.
Scripting the typing judgment A consequence of validity proofs not being
materialized is that type-checking is undecidable in F?. For instance: does the
unit value () solve the hole Γ ` ?u : squash φ ? Well, only if φ holds—a condition
which no type-checker can effectively decide. This implies that the type-checker
cannot, in general, rely on proof terms to reconstruct a proof. Hence, the prim-
itives are designed to provide access to the typing judgment of F? directly, in-
stead of building syntax for proof terms. One can think of F?’s type-checker
as implementing one particular algorithmic heuristic of the typing and validity
judgments—a heuristic which happens to work well in practice. For convenience,
this default type-checking heuristic is also available to metaprograms: this is in
fact precisely what the exact primitive does. Having programmatic access to the
typing judgment also provides the flexibility to tweak VC generation as needed,
instead of leaving it to the default behavior of F?. For instance, the refine_intro
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primitive implements T-Refine. When applied, it produces two new goals, in-
cluding that the refinement actually holds. At that point, a metaprogram can
run any arbitrary tactic on it, instead of letting the F? type-checker collect the
obligation and send it to the SMT solver in bulk with others.
Trust There are two common approaches for the correctness of tactic engines:
(1) the de Bruijn criterion [7], which requires constructing full proofs (or proof
terms) and checking them at the end, hence reducing trust to an indepen-
dent proof-checker; and (2) the LCF style, which applies backwards reasoning
while constructing validation functions at every step, reducing trust to primitive,
forward-style implementations of the system’s inference rules.
As we wish to make use of SMT solvers within F?, the first approach is
not easy. Reconstructing the proofs SMT solvers produce, if any, back into a
proper derivation remains a significant challenge (even despite recent progress,
e.g. [18, 32]). Further, the logical encoding from F? to SMT, along with the
solver itself, are already part of F?’s TCB: shielding Meta-F? from them would
not significantly increase safety of the combined system.
Instead, we roughly follow the LCF approach and implement F?’s typing
rules as the basic user-facing metaprogramming actions. However, instead of
implementing the rules in forward-style and using them to validate (untrusted)
backwards-style tactics, we implement them directly in backwards-style. That is,
they run by breaking down goals into subgoals, instead of combining proven facts
into new proven facts. Using LCF style makes the primitives part of the TCB.
However, given the primitives are sound, any combination of them also is, and
any user-provided metaprogram must be safe due to the abstraction imposed by
the Tac effect, as discussed next.
Correct Evolutions of the Proof State For soundness, it is imperative that
tactics do not arbitrarily drop goals from the proof state, and only discharge
them when they are solved, or when they can be solved by other goals tracked
in the proof state. For a concrete example, consider the following program:
let f : int → int = _ by (intro (); exact (`42))
Here, Meta-F? will create an initial proof state with a single goal of the form
[∅ ` ?u1 : int → int] and begin executing the metaprogram. When applying the
intro primitive, the proof state transitions as shown below.
[∅ ` ?u1 : int → int] [x:int ` ?u2 : int]
Here, a solution to the original goal has not yet been built, since it depends on
the solution to the goal on the right hand side. When it is solved with, say, 42,
we can solve our original goal with λx → 42. To formalize these dependencies, we
say that a proof state φ correctly evolves (via f) to ψ, denoted φ f ψ, when
there is a generic transformation f , called a validation, from solutions to all of
ψ’s goals into correct solutions for φ’s goals. When φ has n goals and ψ has m
goals, the validation f is a function from termm into termn. Validations may be
Meta-F?: Proof Automation with SMT, Tactics, and Metaprograms 19
composed, providing the transitivity of correct evolution, and if a proof state φ
correctly evolves (in any amount of steps) into a state with no more goals, then
we have fully defined solutions to all of φ’s goals. We emphasize that validations
are not constructed explicitly during the execution of metaprograms. Instead we
exploit unification metavariables to instantiate the solutions automatically.
Note that validations may construct solutions for more than one goal, i.e.,
their codomain is not a single term. This is required in Meta-F?, where primitive
steps may not only decompose goals into subgoals, but actually combine goals
as well. Currently, the only primitive providing this behavior is join, which finds
a maximal common prefix of the environment of two irrelevant goals, reverts
the “extra” binders in both goals and builds their conjunction. Combining goals
using join is especially useful for sending multiple goals to the SMT solver in a
single call. When there are common obligations within two goals, joining them
before calling the SMT solver can result in a significantly faster proof.
The situation when this proves useful is in sending the combined goal to
SMT. The bulk of an SMT solver’s work is extending its set of facts by using
logical reasoning and triggering quantifiers via E-matching, the latter being rel-
atively expensive. Once a fact enters the set, it is very efficient to find its proof
which essentially means any particular fact needs to only be proven once. In the
where there are common obligations within two goals, joining them before call-
ing the SMT solver can result in a significantly faster proof. Joining everything,
however, can degrade performance and predictability. Another alternative is, of
course, using tactics to cut via the common obligation, obtaining a separate goal
for it and allowing to assume it elsewhere. While this works, it requires the pro-
grammer to identify the formula and explicitly cut by it, or write an automated
procedure to find these formulas. With Meta-F?, we can simply reuse the solver’s
good support for identifying repeats.
We check that every primitive action respects the  preorder. This relies on
them modeling F?’s typing rules. For example, and unsurprisingly, the following
rule for typing abstractions is what justifies the intro primitive:
T-Fun
Γ, x : t ` e : t′
Γ ` λ(x : t).e : (x : t)→ t′
Then, for the proof state evolution above, the validation function f is the (math-
ematical, meta-level) function taking a term of type int (the solution for ?u2) and
building syntax for its abstraction over x. Further, the intro primitive respects
the correct-evolution preorder, by the very typing rule (T-Fun) from which it is
defined. In this manner, every typing rule induces a syntax-building metapro-
gramming step. Our primitives come from this dual interpretation of typing
rules, which ensures that logical consistency is preserved.
Since the  relation is a preorder, and every metaprogramming primitive we
provide the user evolves the proof state according , it is trivially the case that
the final proof state returned by a (successful) computation is a correct evolution
of the initial one. That means that when the metaprogram terminates, one has
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indeed broken down the proof obligation correctly, and is left with a (hopefully)
simpler set of obligations to fulfill. Note that since  is a preorder, Tac provides
an interesting example of monotonic state [2].
4.2 Extracting Individual Assertions
As discussed, the logical context of a goal processed by a tactic is not always
syntactically evident in the program. And, as shown in the List.splitAt call in divide
from §3.4, some obligations crucially depend on the control-flow of the program.
Hence, the proof state must crucially include these assumptions if proving the
assertion is to succeed. Below, we describe how Meta-F? finds proper contexts in
which to prove the assertions, including control-flow information. Notably, this
process is defined over logical formulae and does not depend at all on F?’s WP
calculus or VC generator: we believe it should be applicable to any VC generator.
As seen in §2.1, the basic mechanism by which Meta-F? attaches a tactic to a
specific sub-goal is assert φ by τ . Our encoding of this expression is built similarly
to F?’s existing assert construct, which is simply sugar for a pure function _assert
of type φ :prop → Lemma (requires φ ) (ensures φ ), which essentially introduces a
cut in the generated VC. That is, the term (assert φ ; e) roughly produces the
verification condition φ∧ (φ=⇒ VCe), requiring a proof of φ at this point, and
assuming φ in the continuation. For Meta-F?, we aim to keep this style while
allowing asserted formulae to be decorated with user-provided tactics that are
tasked with proving or pre-processing them. We do this in three steps.
First, we define the following “phantom” predicate:
let with_tactic (φ : prop) (τ : unit →Tac unit) = φ
Here φ `with_tactic`τ simply associates the tactic τ with φ , and is equivalent to
φ by its definition. Next, we implement the assert_by_tactic lemma, and desugar
assert φ by τ into assert_by_tactic φ τ . This lemma is trivially provable by F?.
let assert_by_tactic (φ : prop) (τ : unit →Tac unit)
: Lemma (requires (φ `with_tactic` τ )) (ensures φ ) = ()
Given this specification, the term (assert φ by τ ; e) roughly produces the verifica-
tion condition φ `with_tactic`τ ∧ (φ=⇒ VCe), with a tagged left sub-goal, and φ
as an hypothesis in the right one. Importantly, F? keeps the with_tactic marker
uninterpreted until the VC needs to be discharged. At that point, it may con-
tain several annotated subformulae. For example, suppose the VC is VC0 below,
where we distinguish an ambient context of variables and hypotheses ∆:
(VC0) ∆ |= X =⇒ (∀ (x:t). R `with_tactic` τ 1 ∧ (R =⇒ S))
In order to run the τ 1 tactic on R, it must first be “split out”. To do so, all logical
information “visible” for τ 1 (i.e. the set of premises of the implications traversed
and the binders introduced by quantifiers) must be included. As for any program
verifier, these hypotheses include the control flow information, postconditions,
and any other logical fact that is known to be valid at the program point where
the corresponding assert R by τ 1 was called. All of them are collected into ∆ as
the term is traversed. In this case, the VC for R is:
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(VC1) ∆, _:X, x:t |= R
Afterwards, this obligation is removed from the original VC. This is done by
replacing it with >, leaving a “skeleton” VC with all remaining facts.
(VC2) ∆ |= X =⇒ (∀ (x:t). > ∧ (R =⇒ S))
The validity of VC1 and VC2 implies that of VC0. F? also recursively descends
into R and S, in case there are more with_tactic markers in them. Then, tactics
are run on the the split VCs (e.g., τ 1 on VC1) to break them down (or solve
them). All remaining goals, including the skeleton, are sent to the SMT solver.
Note that while the obligation to prove R, in VC1, is preprocessed by the
tactic τ 1, the assumption R for the continuation of the code, in VC2, is left as-is.
This is crucial for tactics such as the canonicalizer from §2.1: if the skeleton VC2
contained an assumption for the canonicalized equality it would not help the
SMT solver show the uncanonicalized postcondition.
However, not all nodes marked with with_tactic are proof obligations. Suppose
X in the previous VC was given as (Y `with_tactic`τ 2). In this case, one certainly
does not want to attempt to prove Y, since it is an hypothesis. While it would be
sound to prove it and replace it by >, it is useless at best, and usually irreparably
affects the system. Consider asserting the tautology (⊥`with_tactic`τ ) =⇒ ⊥.
Hence, F? splits such obligations only in strictly-positive positions. On all
others, F? simply drops the with_tactic marker, e.g., by just unfolding the defi-
nition of with_tactic. For regular uses of the assert..by construct, however, all oc-
currences are strictly-positive. It is only when (expert) users use the with_tactic
marker directly that the above discussion might become relevant.
Formally, the soundness of this whole approach is given by the following
metatheorem, which justifies the splitting out of sub-assertions, and by the cor-
rectness of evolution detailed in §4.1. The proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward,
and included in §B. We expect an analogous property to hold in other verifiers
as well (in particular, it holds for first-order logic).
Theorem 1. Let E be a context with Γ ` E : prop ⇒ prop, and φ a squashed
proposition such that Γ ` φ : prop. Then the following holds:
Γ  E[>] Γ, γ(E)  φ
Γ  E[φ]
where γ(E) is the set of binders E introduces. If E is strictly-positive, then the
reverse implication holds as well.
5 Executing Metaprograms Efficiently
F? provides three complementary mechanisms for running metaprograms. The
first two, F?’s call-by-name (CBN) interpreter and a (newly implemented) call-
by-value (CBV) NbE-based evaluator, support strong reduction—henceforth we
refer to these as “normalizers”. In addition, we design and implement a new
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native plugin mechanism that allows both normalizers to interface with Meta-
F? programs extracted to OCaml, reusing F?’s existing extraction pipeline for
this purpose. Below we provide a brief overview of the three mechanisms.
5.1 CBN and CBV Strong Reductions
As described in §3.1, metaprograms, once reified, are simply F? terms of type
proofstate →Div (result a). As such, they can be reduced using F?’s existing com-
putation machinery, a CBN interpreter for strong reductions based on the Kriv-
ine abstract machine (KAM) [25, 47]. Although complete and highly config-
urable, F?’s KAM interpreter is slow, designed primarily for converting types
during dependent type-checking and higher-order unification.
Shifting focus to long-running metaprograms, such as tactics for proofs by
reflection, we implemented an NbE-based strong-reduction evaluator for F? com-
putations. The evaluator is implemented in F? and extracted to OCaml (as is
the rest of F?), thereby inheriting CBV from OCaml. It is similar to Boespflug
et al.’s 2011 NbE-based strong-reduction for Coq, although we do not implement
their low-level, OCaml-specific tag-elimination optimizations—nevertheless, it is
already vastly more efficient than the KAM-based interpreter.
5.2 Native Plugins & Multi-language Interoperability
Since Meta-F? programs are just F? programs, they can also be extracted to
OCaml and natively compiled. Further, they can be dynamically linked into F?
as “plugins”. Plugins can be directly called from the type-checker, as is done for
the primitives, which is much more efficient than interpreting them. However,
compilation has a cost, and it is not convenient to compile every single invocation.
Instead, Meta-F? enables users to choose which metaprograms are to be plugins
(presumably those expected to be computation-intensive, e.g. canon_semiring).
Users can choose their native plugins, while still quickly scripting their higher-
level logic in the interpreter.
This requires (for higher-order metaprograms) a form of multi-language inter-
operability, converting between representations of terms used in the normalizers
and in native code. We designed a small multi-language calculus, with ML-style
polymorphism, to model the interaction between normalizers and plugins and
conversions between terms. We outline it in §C.
Beyond the notable efficiency gains of running compiled code vs. interpreting
it, native metaprograms also require fewer embeddings. Once compiled, metapro-
grams work over the internal, concrete types for proofstate, term, etc., instead of
over their F? representations (though still treating them abstractly). Hence,
compiled metaprograms can call primitives without needing to embed their ar-
guments or unembed their results. Further, they can call each other directly as
well. Indeed, operationally there is little operational difference between a prim-
itive and a compiled metaprogram used as a plugin.
Native plugins, however, are not a replacement for the normalizers, for sev-
eral reasons. First, the overhead in compilation might not be justified by the
Meta-F?: Proof Automation with SMT, Tactics, and Metaprograms 23
execution speed-up. Second, extraction to OCaml erases types and proofs. As
a result, the F? interface of the native plugins can only contain types that can
also be expressed in OCaml, thereby excluding full-dependent types—internally,
however, they can be dependently typed. Third, being OCaml programs, native
plugins do not support reducing open terms, which is often required. However,
when the programs treat their open arguments parametrically, relying on para-
metric polymorphism, the normalizers can pass such arguments as-is, thereby
recovering open reductions in some cases. This allows us to use native datastruc-
ture implementations (e.g. List), which is much faster than using the normalizers,
even for open terms. We discuss this briefly in §C.
6 Experimental evaluation
We now present an experimental evaluation of Meta-F?. First, we provide bench-
marks comparing our reflective canonicalizer from §2.1 to calling the SMT solver
directly without any canonicalization. Then, we return to the parsers and seri-
alizers from §2.3 and show how, for VCs that arise, a domain-specific tactic is
much more tractable than a SMT-only proof.
6.1 A Reflective Tactic for Partial Canonicalization
In §2.1, we have described the canon_semiring tactic that rewrites semiring ex-
pressions into sums of products. We find that this tactic significantly improves
proof robustness. The table below compares the success rates and times for the
poly_multiply lemma from §2.1. To test the robustness of each alternative, we
run the tests 200 times while varying the SMT solver’s random seed. The smtix
rows represent asking the solver to prove the lemma without any help from
tactics, where i represents the resource limit (rlimit) multiplier given to the
solver. This rlimit is memory-allocation based and independent of the partic-
ular system or current load. For the interp and native rows, the canon_semiring
tactic is used, running it using F?’s KAM normalizer and as a native plugin
respectively—both with an rlimit of 1. For each setup, we display the success
rate of verification, the average (CPU) time taken for the SMT queries (not
counting the time for parsing/processing the theory) with its standard devia-
tion, and the average total time (its standard deviation coincides with that of the
queries). When applicable, the time for tactic execution (which is independent
of the seed) is displayed. The smt rows show very poor success rates: even when
upping the rlimit to a whopping 100x, over three quarters of the attempts fail.
Rate Queries Tactic Total
smt1x 0.5% 0.216 ± 0.001 – 2.937
smt2x 2% 0.265 ± 0.003 – 2.958
smt3x 4% 0.304 ± 0.004 – 3.022
smt6x 10% 0.401 ± 0.008 – 3.155
smt12x 12.5% 0.596 ± 0.031 – 3.321
smt25x 16.5% 1.063 ± 0.079 – 3.790
smt50x 22% 2.319 ± 0.230 – 5.030
smt100x 24% 5.831 ± 0.776 – 8.550
interp 100% 0.141 ± 0.001 1.156 4.003
native 100% 0.139 ± 0.001 0.212 3.071
Note how the (relative) standard de-
viation increases with the rlimit:
this is due to successful runs tak-
ing rather random times, and fail-
ing ones exhausting their resources in
similar times. The setups using the
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tactic show a clear increase in ro-
bustness: canonicalizing the assertion
causes this proof to always succeed,
even at the default rlimit. We re-
call that the tactic variants still leave
goals for SMT solving, namely, the skeleton for the original VC and the canonical-
ized equality left by the tactic, easily dischargeable by the SMT solver through
much more well-behaved linear reasoning. The last column shows that native
compilation speeds up this tactic’s execution by about 5x.
6.2 Combining SMT and Tactics for the Parser Generator
In §2.3, we presented a library of combinators and a metaprogramming approach
to automate the construction of verified, mutually inverse, low-level parsers and
serializers from type descriptions. Beyond generating the code, tactics are used
to process and discharge proof obligations that arise when using the combinators.
We present three strategies for discharging these obligations, including those
of bijectivity that arise when constructing parsers and serializers for enumerated
types. First, we used F?’s default strategy to present all of these proofs directly
to the SMT solver. Second, we programmed a ∼100 line tactic to discharge
these proofs without relying on the SMT solver at all. Finally, we used a hybrid
approach where a simple, 5-line tactic is used to prune the context of the proof
removing redundant facts before presenting the resulting goals to the SMT solver.
Size SMT only Tactic only Hybrid
4 178 17.3 6.6
7 468 38.3 9.8
10 690 63.0 19.4
The table alongside shows the total time
in seconds for verifying metaprogrammed
low-level parsers and serializers for enumer-
ations of different sizes. In short, the hybrid
approach scales the best; the tactic-only ap-
proach is somewhat slower; while the SMT-only approach scales poorly and is
an order of magnitude slower. Our hybrid approach is very simple. With some
more work, a more sophisticated hybrid strategy could be more performant still,
relying on tactic-based normalization proofs for fragments of the VC best han-
dled computationally (where the SMT solver spends most of its time), while
using SMT only for integer arithmetic, congruence closure etc. However, with
Meta-F?’s ability to manipulate proof contexts programmatically, our simple
context-pruning tactic provides a big payoff at a small cost.
7 Related Work
Many SMT-based program verifiers [8, 9, 20, 35, 49], rely on user hints, in the
form of assertions and lemmas, to complete proofs. This is the predominant
style of proving used in tools like Dafny [48], Liquid Haskell [61], Why3 [34], and
F? itself [59]. However, there is a growing trend to augment this style of semi-
automated proof with interactive proofs. For example, systems like Why3 [34]
allow VCs to be discharged using ITPs such as Coq, Isabelle/HOL, and PVS,
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but this requires an additional embedding of VCs into the logic of the ITP in
question. In recent concurrent work, support for effectful reflection proofs was
added to Why3 [51], and it would be interesting to investigate if this could also
be done in Meta-F?. Grov and Tumas [40] present Tacny, a tactic framework for
Dafny, which is, however, limited in that it only transforms source code, with the
program verifier unchanged. In contrast, Meta-F? combines the benefits of an
SMT-based program verifier and those of tactic proofs within a single language.
Moving away from SMT-based verifiers, ITPs have long relied on separate
languages for proof scripting, starting with Edinburgh LCF [38] and ML, and
continuing with HOL, Isabelle and Coq, which are either extensible via ML,
or have dedicated tactic languages [4, 30, 57, 63]. Meta-F? builds instead on a
recent idea in the space of dependently typed ITPs [23, 31, 43, 64] of reusing
the object-language as the meta-language. This idea first appeared in Mtac, a
Coq-based tactics framework for Coq [43, 64], and has many generic benefits in-
cluding reusing the standard library, IDE support, and type checker of the proof
assistant. Mtac can additionally check the partial correctness of tactics, which
is also sometimes possible in Meta-F? but still rather limited (§3.4). Meta-F?’s
design is instead more closely inspired by the metaprogramming frameworks of
Idris [23] and Lean [31], which provide a deep embedding of terms that metapro-
grams can inspect and construct at will without dependent types getting in the
way. However, F?’s effects, its weakest precondition calculus, and its use of SMT
solvers distinguish Meta-F? from these other frameworks, presenting both chal-
lenges and opportunities, as discussed in this paper.
Some SMT solvers also include tactic engines [28], which allow to process
queries in custom ways. However, using SMT tactics from a program verifier is
not very practical. To do so effectively, users must become familiar not only with
the solver’s language and tactic engine, but also with the translation from the
program verifier to the solver. Instead, in Meta-F?, everything happens within
a single language. Also, to our knowledge, these tactics are usually coarsely-
grained, and we do not expect them to enable developments such as §2.2. Plus,
SMT tactics do not enable metaprogramming.
Finally, ITPs are seeing increasing use of “hammers” such as Sledgeham-
mer [15, 16, 55] in Isabelle/HOL, and similar tools for HOL Light and HOL4 [44],
and Mizar [45], to interface with ATPs. This technique is similar to Meta-F?,
which, given its support for a dependently typed logic is especially related to
a recent hammer for Coq [27]. Unlike these hammers, Meta-F? does not aim
to reconstruct SMT proofs, gaining efficiency at the cost of trusting the SMT
solver. Further, whereas hammers run in the background, lightening the load on
a user otherwise tasked with completing the entire proof, Meta-F? relies more
heavily on the SMT solver as an end-game tactic in nearly all proofs.
8 Conclusions
A key challenge in program verification is to balance automation and expres-
siveness. Whereas tactic-based ITPs support highly expressive logics, the tactic
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author is responsible for all the automation. Conversely, SMT-based program
verifiers provide good, scalable automation for comparatively weaker logics, but
offer little recourse when verification fails. A design that allows picking the right
tool, at the granularity of each verification sub-task, is a worthy area of research.
Meta-F? presents a new point in this space: by using hand-written tactics along-
side SMT-automation, we have written proofs that were previously impractical
in F?, and (to the best of our knowledge) in other SMT-based program verifiers.
This flurry of new use-cases is backed by an efficient native compilation
scheme. Natively evaluating metaprograms allows to dynamically extend F?
with type-safe, semantically correct (by the safety of TAC), user-defined custom
behavior without a performance penalty—witnessing the close interoperability
between F? and its metalanguage.
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A Metaprogramming verified parsers and serializers
We consider parser and serializer specifications as ghost code that “operates” on
finite sequences of bytes of unbounded lengths. For a given type t, a serializer
for t marshals any data of type t into a finite sequence of bytes; and a parser for
t reads from a sequence of bytes, checks whether it corresponds to a valid data
of type t, and if so, returns that parsed data and the number of bytes consumed.
The serializer specification always succeeds; the parser specification succeeds
if and only if the input data is valid with respect to the parser. On those specifi-
cations, we aim to prove that the parser and the serializer are partial inverses of
each other. We encode these requirements as refinements on the types of parser
and serializer specifications:
type byte = FStar.UInt8.t
type parser t = (input: seq byte) →GTot (option (t ∗ (x: nat { x < length input } )))
let serialize_then_parse_eq_id #t (p: parser t) (s: (t →GTot (seq byte))) =
(∀ (x: t) . let y = s x in p y == Some (x, length y))
let parse_then_serialize_eq_id #t (p: parser t) (s: (t →GTot (seq byte))) =
(∀ (x: seq byte) . match p x with | Some (y, len) → s y == slice x 0 len | _ →>) })
type serializer #t (p: parser t) = (s: (t →GTot (seq byte))
{ serialize_then_parse_eq_id p s ∧ parse_then_serialize_eq_id p s })
Whereas those specifications are ghost code, we would like to generate im-
plementations that can be extracted to C. To this end, we generate stateful
implementations written in the Low? set of F? [56], operating on buffers, which
are Low? mutable data structures representing C arrays. There, instead of a
sequence of bytes, the parser implementation is given an input buffer and its
length; and the serializer implementation is given an output buffer (along with
its length) onto which it is to serialize the data. This means that, given a piece
of data to serialize and a destination buffer, a serializer implementation can suc-
ceed only if the serialized data fits into the destination buffer; if so, then the
serializer will return the number of bytes written.
We bake the correctness of the implementations with respect to their speci-
fications at the level of their types:
type buffer8 = LowStar.Buffer.buffer FStar.UInt8.t
type u32 = FStar.UInt32.t
let parser32_postcond #t (p: parser t) (input: buffer8) (l: u32 {l == len input})
(h: mem) (res: option (t ∗ u32)) (h’: mem) =
modifies loc_none h h’ ∧ (∗ memory safety ∗)
match p (as_seq h input), res with (∗ functional correctness ∗)
| Some (x, ln), Some (x’, ln’) → x’ == x ∧ FStar.UInt32.v ln’ == ln
| None, None →>| _ →⊥
type parser32 #t (p: parser t) = (input: buffer8) → (l: u32 { l == len input } )
→ Stack (option (t ∗ u32))
(requires (λ h → live h input)) (ensures (parser32_postcond p input))
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Lemma poly_multiply
(n p r h r0 r1 h0 h1 h2 s1 d0 d1 d2 hh : Z)
(H: p > 0 ∧ r1 ≥ 0 ∧ n > 0 ∧ 4 ∗ (n ∗ n) = p + 5 ∧ r = r1 ∗ n + r0 ∧
h = h2 ∗ (n ∗ n) + h1 ∗ n + h0 ∧ s1 = r1 + (r1 / 4) ∧ r1 mod 4 = 0 ∧
d0 = h0 ∗ r0 + h1 ∗ s1 ∧ d1 = h0 ∗ r1 + h1 ∗ r0 + h2 ∗ s1 ∧
d2 = h2 ∗ r0 ∧ hh = d2 ∗ (n ∗ n) + d1 ∗ n + d0)
: ((h ∗ r) mod p = hh mod p).
Proof.
repeat match goal with H : ?A ∧ ?B | _ => destruct H end.
subst.
match goal with | ?A mod p = ?B mod p => change (eqm p A B) end.
match goal with K : r1 mod 4 = 0 | _ =>
apply Z_div_exact_full2 in K; try omega;
revert K;
generalize (r1 / 4);
intro u;
intros; subst
end.
pose (b := (h2 ∗ n + h1) ∗ u).
generalize (Zopp_eqm p).
generalize (Zplus_eqm p).
generalize (Zminus_eqm p).
generalize (Zmult_eqm p).
generalize (eqm_setoid p).
set (e := eqm p).
intros.
match goal with | e _ ?R =>
generalize (modulo_addition_lemma R p b)
end.
fold e. intro K. setoid_rewrite < K. clear K.
assert (p = 4 ∗ (n ∗ n) 5) as J by omega.
replace (b ∗ p) with (b ∗ (4 ∗ (n ∗ n) 5)) by congruence.
unfold b.
apply eq_implies_eqm.
ring.
Qed.
Fig. 1: Coq proof of poly_multiply
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let serializer32_postcond #t (p: parser t) (s: serializer p) (output: buffer8)
(l: u32 {l == len output}) (x: t) (h: mem) (res: option u32) (h’: mem) =
live h output ∧ live h’ output ∧ modifies (loc_buffer b) h h’ ∧ (∗ memory safety ∗)
let ln = length (s x) in
match res with (∗ functional correctness ∗)
| Some ln’ →
FStar.UInt32.v ln’ == ln ∧ ln ≤ FStar.UInt32.v l ∧
let b’ = sub b 0ul ln’ in modifies (loc_buffer b’) h h’ ∧ as_seq h’ b’ == s x
| None → ln > FStar.UInt32.v l
type serializer32 #t (#p: parser t) (s: serializer p) =
(output: buffer8) → (l: u32 { l == len output } ) → (x: t) →Stack (option u32)
(requires (λ h → live h output)) (ensures (serializer32_postcond s output l x))
Generating the specification from a F? datatype Instead of mandating the
user to write the parser and serializer specification themselves, we write a Meta-
F? tactic, gen_specs, to generate both the parser and the serializer specifications
directly from the F? type t given by the user. These tactics operate by syntax
inspection on t itself, and generates the parser and serializer specifications using
our combinators.
Contrary to Coq’s Ltac, Meta-F? tactics can also inspect definitions of induc-
tive types. From there, we made gen_specs also generate a parser and serializer
specification out of an enumeration type defined as a F? inductive type whose
constructors have no arguments: for such a type with n ≤ 256 constructors, the
corresponding parser will associate a unique 8-bit integer from 0 to n−1 to each
constructor. For instance, if t is defined as a F? enumeration type:
As before, by virtue of the correctness of serializers being baked in their
type, the correctness of the serializer generated by gen_specs does not appear
as such as a verification condition when F? is type-checking the generated term.
In the example above, the only proof obligations generated are those to correctly
type-check the rewriting functions themselves passed to serialize_synth (e.g.
enum constructors are rewritten to integers less than 4), and the precondition
of serialize_synth (i.e. the fact that the two rewriting functions are inverse of
each other.) These can be discharged by the SMT solver, but they can also be
discharged automatically by our tactics directly by case analysis on the inductive
type, or by bounded integer enumeration.
Binders For instance, we specified seq_p, a combinator for dependent parsing:6
let seq_p #t1 (p1: parser t1) #t2 (p2: (t1 →Tot (parser t2))) : Tot (parser t2) =
λinput →match p1 input with | None →None | Some (x1, cons1) →
let input2 = slice input cons1 (length input) in
match p2 x1 input2 with
| None →None | Some (x2, cons2) →Some (x2, cons1 + cons2)
6 This parsing combinator is based on yet unpublished work by Tej Chajed. Building
serializers for parsers derived from seq_p is explicitly out of the scope of this paper.
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Then, we implemented it in Low? (seq_pi), and manually proved it correct.
From there, the user can write a simple parser specification for a parser that
parses an integer encoded in one or two bytes depending on its value (where
parse_ret x is a parser that returns x without reading its byte input:)
let example : parser_spec FStar.Int16.t =
seq_p parse_u8
(λ lo → if lo <^ 128uy then parse_ret (cast_u8_to_i16 lo)
else parse_synth parse_u8 (λ hi → cast_u8_to_i16 (lo %^ 128uy)
+^ cast_u8_to_i16 hi))
Then, if the user writes:
let example_impl : parser_impl example = _ by gen_parser_impl
then gen_parser32 inspects the shape of the goal, which is parser32 example,
and so generates the following Low? implementation:
seq_pi parse32_u8 (λ lo →
parse32_ifthenelse (lo <^ 128uy) (λ _ → parse32_ret (cast_u8_to_i16 lo)) (λ _ →
parse32_synth parse32_u8 (λ hi → cast_u8_to_i16 (lo %^ 128uy) +^ cast_u8_to_i16 hi)))
from where KreMLin [56] then inlines the corresponding implementation
combinators to produce C code.
First, gen_parser32 inspects the shape of the goal to determine the type of
the data to be parsed and the parser specification; then, it calls a recursive tactic
gen_parser32’ that inspects the shape of the parser specification and actually
builds the implementation.
module T = FStar.Tactics
let rec gen_parser32’ (env: T.env) (t: T.term) (p: T.term) : T.Tac T.term =
let (hd, tl) = app_head_tail p in
if hd `T.term_eq` (`(parse_ret)) then T.mk_app (`(parse32_ret)) tl else
if hd `T.term_eq` (`(parse_u8)) then (`(parse32_u8)) else
if hd `T.term_eq` (`(seq_p)) then match tl with
| [(t, _); (p, _); (t’, _); (p’, _)] →
begin match T.inspect p’ with
| T.Tv_Abs bx body →
let p32 = gen_parser32’ env k t p in
let env’ = T.push_binder env bx in
let body’ = gen_parser32’ env’ k’ t’ body in
let p32’ = T.pack (T.Tv_Abs bx body’) in
(`(seq_pi #(`#t) #(`#p) (`#p32) (`#t’) (`#p’) (`#p32’)))
| _ → ...
end
| _ → ...
else
...
let gen_parser32 () : T.Tac unit =
let (hd, tl) = app_head_tail (T.cur_goal ()) in
if hd `T.term_eq` (`parser32)
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then match tl with
| [(t, _); (p, _)] →
let env = T.cur_env () in
let p32 = gen_parser32’ env t p in
T.exact_guard p32;
| _ → ...
When gen_parser32 (resp. gen_serializer32) builds the parser (resp. se-
rializer) implementation, it may generate verification conditions due to specific
preconditions required by certain combinators (such as the precondition of the
serialize_synth rewriting serializer combinator: the rewriting functions being
inverse of each other). Contrary to Coq, there are no proof objects, so those
preconditions need to be proven again even if they had been proven earlier by
the user at the specification level. Nevertheless, those preconditions can be auto-
matically solved by our tactics, or they can directly be sent to the SMT solver.
However, by virtue of the correctness of the implementation combinators be-
ing baked in their type, typechecking the resulting term generated by gen_parser32
triggers no verification condition other than those preconditions required by the
specific combinators, and unification constraints, the latter solved by reflexivity.
In particular, the memory safety and correctness of the implementations gener-
ated by gen_parser32 do not appear as such as verification conditions when F?
is type-checking the terms generated by gen_parser32.
A.1 Verified meta-programming of program transformations
compile_bind expects, in bind f1 f2, that f2 be an abstraction, and so needs to
manipulate binders and recursively compile f1 and the body of f2. This will, in
the latter case, make some bound variables appear free in terms being compiled.
If the head term t0 is a free variable not corresponding to any combinator,
then compile_fvar unfolds it, compiles the unfolded term, and inserts a coercion.7
In most cases, a free variable to be unfolded will correspond to a function defini-
tion, so that unfolding will yield a β-redex, which compile_fvar reduces by calling
a normalization tactic that we provide as part of Meta-F?. This needs an en-
vironment (e: env) tracking the bound variables encountered by nested calls to
compile_bind.
We show below the implementation of compile_bind, which is representative
of most features of Meta-F? that we use for our compile tactic.
(∗ extract the head symbol and the arguments of an application ∗)
let rec app_head_rev_tail (t: term) : Tac (term ∗ list argv) =
match inspect t with | Tv_App u v → let (x, l) = app_head_rev_tail u in (x, v :: l) | _ →
(t, [])
let app_head_tail (t: term) : Tac (term ∗ list argv) = let (x, l) = app_head_rev_tail t in (x, rev l)
7 We defined an explicit coercion combinator, coerce_sz, such that
coerce_sz f1 f1_sz f2 is well-typed and is a m_sz f2 as soon as f1 () == f2 ()
as m specifications.
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let compile_bind (e: env) (ty: term) (t: term) (compile: env → term → term →Tac term) : Tac term =
let (t0, ar) = app_head_tail t in
guard (t0 = quote bind); (∗ fail if false ∗)
match ar with
| [ (τ1, _); (τ2, _); (f1, _); (f2, _); ] →
begin match inspect f2 with
| Tv_Abs v f2_body →
let f1’ = compile e τ1 f1 in
let e’ = push_binder e v in
let f2_body’ = compile e’ τ2 f2_body in
let f2’ = pack (Tv_Abs v f2_body’) in
(`(bind_sz #(`#τ 1) #(`#τ 2) (`#f1) (`#f1’) (`#f2) (`#f2’)))
| _ → fail "compile_bind:␣Not␣an␣abstraction"
end
| _ → fail "compile_bind:␣4␣arguments␣expected"
Putting everything together Finally, the following wrapper combinator Φ
puts everything together, taking a specification f and its size and buffer imple-
mentations, and yielding a stateful function, fitting in the Low? subset of F?
amenable to extraction to C, that first computes the expected size of the out-
put, then allocates one single buffer using the C malloc, then uses it to write the
output of f :
let Φ τ (f: m τ) (f_sz: m_sz f) (f_st: m_st f) : ST (option (τ ∗ buffer U8.t)) (requires (λ _ →
>))
(ensures (λ h res h’ → let (r, log) = f () in
if length log > 231 − 1 then res == None else
Some? res ∧ (let (Some (r’, b)) = res in r == b ∧ fresh b h h’ ∧ as_seq h b == log)
)) = match f_sz with | None →None | Some (_, sz’) →
let b = rcreate_mm root 42uy sz in (∗ then allocate a fresh buffer ∗)
let (r, _) = f_st b in (∗ then write the output into the buffer ∗)
Some (r, b)
Related Work Our approach of generating verified low-level formatters is re-
lated to Amin and Rompf’s [3] work on LMS-Verify. They use metaprogram-
ming facilities in Scala to generate C code together with proof annotations to
be checked by Frama-C [26], an SMT-based C verifier. In contrast, we generate
correct-by-construction imperative Low? code, which is verified by F? before be-
ing translated to C by the KreMLin compiler. LMS-Verify has also been used to
generate efficient and safe HTTP parsers, a larger-scale effort than the network
message formatters than we have currently done.
Meta-F?: Proof Automation with SMT, Tactics, and Metaprograms 33
B Proof of Theorem 1
This proof is based on the formal definition of EMF?, a recent formalization of
an F? subset [1]. We use the same notation and rule names from there, but the
proof is nevertheless quite direct with just minimum familiarity with EMF?. We
use E to represent F? contexts:
E = ·
| tE | Et
| λ(x : t).E | λ(x : E).t
| (x : t)→ E | (x : E)→ t
| x : t{E} | x : E{t}
. . .
Contexts present a set of bound variables to their hole. We denote those
variables by γ(E):
γ(·) = ∅
γ(λ(x : t).E) = {x} ∪ γ(E)
γ(λ(x : E).t) = γ(E)
. . .
We say a context E has type t1 ⇒ t2 for Γ (noted by Γ ` E : t1 ⇒ t2) when
for all e such that Γ, γ(E) ` e : t1 we also have Γ ` E[e] : t2.
B.1 Soundness of splitting the proof obligation
The proof follows mainly from the following lemma:
Lemma 1.
Γ, γ(E)  t1 = t2
Γ  E[t1] = E[t2]
Proof. The proof follows from applying functional extensionality and using a
carefully crafted abstraction.
Let S = λf.E[f(γ(E))] (where f(γ(E)) represents f applied to every variable
in γ(E), sequentially). Also, λγ(E).t represents abstracting E over the variables
in γ(E), and similarly for ∀γ(E).t.
Then,
Γ, γ(E)  t1 = t2
Γ  ∀γ(E).t1 = t2 V-∀i
Γ  (λγ(E).t1) = (λγ(E).t2)
V-Ext
Γ  S(λγ(E).t1) = S(λγ(E).t2)
V-EqP
Γ  E[t1] = E[t2]
Reduction
Note that the particular set of contexts E does not influence the proof.
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Having such lemma, the theorem is proven as follows:
Γ  E[>]
Γ, γ(E)  φ
Γ, γ(E)  φ ⇐⇒ > Trivial
Γ, γ(E)  φ = > PropExt
Γ  E[φ] = E[>] Lemma
Γ  E[φ]
B.2 Partial completeness of splitting the proof obligation
While the previous theorem allows to soundly split any subformulae within a
VC, we have seen that some of them constraint the system. Here we prove that
for a particular set of contexts, splitting does not make the judgments stronger,
and via Theorem 1, then they are equivalent.
We define a particular shape of “positive” contexts P . We don’t attempt to
follow all of EMF*’s syntax, just the parts we commonly see as VCs in practice.
P = ·
| φ ∧ P | P ∧ φ
| ∀(x : t).P
In EMF?, an implication a ⇒ b is just sugar for ∀(_ : a).b, so they are
considered as well.
Theorem 2. Take Γ , E, and φ such that: (1) φ is squashed, (2) Γ ` E : prop→
prop and (3) Γ ` φ : prop. Then the following holds
Γ  P [φ]
Γ, γ(P )  φ Γ  P [>]
Proof. By induction on the structure of P , keeping Γ and φ universally quanti-
fied.
– For P = ·, trivial
– For P = ψ∧P ′, our hypothesis is Γ  ψ∧P ′[φ]. Hence, Γ  ψ and Γ  P ′[φ].
By the IH, we get Γ, γ(P ′)  φ (note that γ(P ) = γ(P ′)) and Γ  P ′[>]. By
weakening and conjunction, we can prove Γ, γ(P ′)  ψ∧φ and Γ  ψ∧P ′[>],
and conclude.
– For P = P ′ ∧ ψ, the reasoning is analogous.
– For P = ∀(x : t).P ′, our hypothesis is Γ  ∀(x : t).P ′[φ]. Hence, we get
Γ, x : t  P ′[φ] by eliminating the quantifier. From the IH, we get Γ, x :
t, γ(P ′)  φ and Γ, x : t  E[>]. From this last one, we can use V-∀i to
obtain Γ  ∀(x : t).E[>], and conclude (noting that γ(P ) = x : t, γ(P ′)).
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C Modelling native plugins
This appendix contains the formal definitions of our multi-language interoper-
ability model. We formalize the semantics of source and target language as well
as the translation between the two. We convey the essential ideas in the text
below, and present full details in Figures 5–19 that follow the discussion below.
Part 1: Modeling Native Plugins with Simple Types
Reflecting our requirement that plugins are only supported at ML-typeable in-
terfaces, we start with a source language that is an intrinsically typed (Church
style), standard, simply typed lambda calculus with pairs and sums. Later in
the section, we will add ML-style rank 1 polymorphism to it. Conversely, re-
flecting the type-less native representation of compiled OCaml code, our target
language is the untyped lamdba calculus. For clarity, we markup the the syntax
using colors, using blue for the source language and red for the target. Aside
from the standard forms, we have two new expression forms to account for the
“alien” expressions of one language appearing in the other: [e]τ , which embeds
a τ -typed source language expression into the target language, and {e}τ , which
unembeds a target language expression to the source language at type τ .
We explain the reductions through a small example. Consider a source lan-
guage term (λx:Z.x) 0, where we want to compile the identity function to native
code and then perform the application. The first step is to translate the function
to the target, by systematically erasing the types, and unembed it in the source.
In our example, the source language term then becomes {λx.x}Z→Z 0.
Source semantics and unembedding (Figure 2) At a beta-reduction step
(e.g. rule S-App below), the source semantics uses a meta-function force(v) to
examine the head of the application v. In addition to the usual values, the term
{v}τ is a source value iff v is a target value. If the head is such a value, force()
invokes the unembedding coercion Cτ (v) to coerce it to a suitable source value.
For structural types, this amounts to lazily coercing the head constructor of the
term (see below). For function types, a source-level closure is allocated, which
first embeds its argument in the target, reduces a target application (using rule
S-Alien), and then unembeds the result back in the source.
In our example, reduction proceeds by rule S-App by first applying the unem-
bedding coercion CZ→Z() to λx.x to get λx:Z.{(λx.x) [x]Z}Z, and then applying
the substitution to get {(λx.x) [0]Z}Z.
Target semantics and embeddings (Figure 3) The target semantics is
standard CBV. The only new rule is T-Alien, which first reduces the foreign
source term using the source semantics, and then proceeds to embed the resulting
value into the target language, using the embedding coercion Cτ (v), as shown
below. In our implementation, this rule is realized via a callback to the F?’s
normalizer.
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e →∗ v
{e}τ → {v}τ
S-Alien
force(v) = λx:τ .e
v e2 → e[e2/x] S-App
force(v) =
{
Cτ (v) if v = {v}τ
v otherwise
Cunit(()) = ()
Cτ1×τ2((v1,v2)) = ({v1}τ1 ,{v2}τ2)
Cτ1→τ2(e) = λx:τ1.{e [x]τ1}τ2
Fig. 2: Source semantics
e →∗ v
[e]τ → Cτ (v)
T-Alien
(λx.e) v → e[v/x] T-App
Cτ1→τ2(e) = λx.[e {x}τ1 ]τ2
Cτ1×τ2((e1,e2)) = ([e1]τ1 ,[e2]τ2)
Cτ ′({v}τ ) = v if τ ≡ τ ′
Fig. 3: Target semantics
The last case in the definition of the coercion cancels superfluous embed-
dings, in case the term inside is an unembedding. Continuing with our exam-
ple, {(λx.x) [0]Z}Z reduces using S-Alien, which reduces the application in its
premise by first reducing [0]Z to 0 (using rule T-Alien, with CZ(0) = 0), and
then using rule T-App to get 0. The rule S-Alien then returns {0}Z to the F?
normalizer, which applies the unembedding coercion to get 0.
Translation from source to target Fig. 4 shows a few selected cases in the
translation of source to target terms. The key rule is Abs, which translates a
source abstraction to a target abstraction. Rather than maintaining an explicit
mapping of source variables to target variables, the translation embeds the target
variable x in the source body of the abstraction. Later on, the Box rule finds the
embedding, and removes it, leaving only the intended variable in the translated
target program. As such, any closed source term is translated to a closed target
term, without any embeddings or unembeddings in it.
Rule Var is therefore only triggered for open variables that have not been
unembedded by Abs already. The formalization accounts for this, and remains
valid in the presence of open terms. From an implementation perspective, how-
ever, we cannot in general compile open terms to OCaml. Therefore, we restrict
ourselves to compiling top-level definitions, in which the only open variables
are other top-level definitions. Such top-level definitions have a name, which we
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know how to compile to OCaml. Because of this restriction, plugin extraction
works at the level of top-level definitions, which are the only AST nodes that
can be marked with the plugin attribute.
x  [x]·Γ (x)
Var {e}δτ  e
Box
ei  ei
(e1,e2)  (e1,e2)
Pair
e[{x}·τ/x]  e
λx:τ .e  λx.e
Abs
ei  ei
e1 e2  e1 e2
App
Fig. 4: Translation from source to target
Part 2: Adding ML-style Polymorphism
The key observation in adding ML-style polymorphism is as follows. Since we
only consider target terms compiled from well-typed source terms, by virtue
of parametricity, a compiled polymorphic function must treat its argument ab-
stractly. As a result, the normalizers can pass such arguments as-is without
applying any embedding coercions—passing an open term is simply a subcase
without further difficulty. Thus, we can leverage polymorphism to support such
limited but useful open reductions.
In the formal model, we add an opaque construct to the target language,
written as 〈e〉, which denotes an embedding of e at some abstract type A (as
mentioned above, coercion to opaque is a no-op in the implementation). The
coercion functions are extended with rules to introduce and eliminate opaque
terms (the δ superscript carries type substitutions as a technical device), e.g.:
CδA(e) = 〈e〉 CδA(〈e〉) = e Cδτ1×τ2((e1,e2)) = (Pδτ1(e1),Pδτ2(e2))
where Pδτ (e) is 〈e〉 when τ = A, or a usual type-directed embedding otherwise.
The source semantics is extended with a rule for type applications, while target
semantics, being untyped, remains as-is.
Consider an application of the polymorphic identity function to a variable y:
(ΛA.λx:A.x) Z y. As before, we would like to compile the function to native code
and then reduce the applications—except this time it is an open term. Transla-
tion of the function and its embedding in the source yields {λx.x}·∀A.A→A Z y. We
now apply the unembedding coercion C·∀A.A→A(λx.x) which returns
a source type abstraction ΛA.C·A→A(λx.x). Reducing the arrow coercion next,
we get ΛA.λx:A.{(λx.x) P ·A(x)}·A, where P ·A(x) = 〈x〉, as mentioned above.
This is the key idea—when the original application reaches the beta-reduction
with argument y (after the type application is reduced), y is simply substituted
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in this opaque construct, which is then returned back to the F? normalizer as
{〈y〉}[A 7→Z]A . The normalizer can then apply the identity unembedding and get y.
This ability to reduce open terms relying on polymorphism allows us to
evaluate expressions like {List.map}·∀A.∀B.(A→B)→listA→listB Z Z f [0; ...; 106], with
f a free variable, using native datastructure implementations (List in this case),
which is much faster than using the normalizers.
Part 3: Full Details on our Multi-language Interoperability Model
Types τ ::= unit | A | τ1→τ2 | τ1×τ2 | τ1+τ2
Type Schemes σ ::= ∀A.σ | τ
Environments Γ ::= · | Γ , x : τ
∆ ::= · | ∆,A
Substitutions δ ::= · | δ[A 7→τ ]
Expressions e ::= () | x | λx:τ .e | e1 e2
| ΛA.e | e τ
| (e1,e2) | e.1 | e.2
| inl e | inr e
| case(e, x : τ1.e1, x : τ2.e2)
| {e}δτ
Fig. 5: Source Language
Expressions e ::= () | x | λx.e | e1 e2
| (e1,e2) | e.1 | e.2
| inl e | inr e
| case(e, x.e1, x.e2)
| [e]δτ | 〈e〉
Environments Γ ::= · | Γ , x
Fig. 6: Target Language
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∆ ` τ wf
∆,A ` A wf TyVar
∆,A ` e wf
∆ ` ∀A.τ wf Scheme
∀ x, ∆ ` Γ (x) wf
∆ ` Γ wf Env
Fig. 7: Type Well-formedness
∆ ` τ wf
· ` · wf Empty
∆ ` δ wf ∆ ` τ wf
∆,A ` δ[A 7→τ ] wf Cons
Fig. 8: Type Substitution Well-formedness
∆; Γ ` e : τ
∆; Γ ` e ok
∆; Γ ` {e}δτ : δτ
Alien
Fig. 9: Source Typing
40 Martínez et al.
e → e′
e → e′
E[e] → E[e′] Ctx
force(v) = λx:τ .e
v e2 → e[e2/x]
App
force(v) = ΛA.e′
v τ → e′[τ/A] TApp
force(v) = inl e′
case(v, x : τ1.e1, x : τ2.e2) → e1[e′/x]
CaseL
force(v) = inr e′
case(v, x : τ1.e1, x : τ2.e2) → e2[e′/x]
CaseR
force(v) = (e1,e2)
v.i → ei
Proj
e →∗ v
{e}δτ → {v}δτ
Alien
where
force(v) =
{
Cδτ (v) if e = {v}δτ and e →∗ v
v otherwise
Fig. 10: Evaluation in the Source Language
e → e′
e → e′
E[e] → E[e′] Ctx (λx.e) v → e[v/x] App
case(inl v, x.e1, x.e2) → e1[v/x]
CaseL
case(inr v, x.e1, x.e2) → e2[v/x]
CaseL
(v1,v2).i → vi
Proj
e →∗ v
[e]
δ
τ → Cδτ (v)
Alien
Fig. 11: Evaluation in the Target Language
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()[τ/A] = ()
λx:τ ′.e[τ/A] = λx:τ ′[τ/A].e[τ/A]
...
{e}δτ ′ [τ/A] = {e[τ/A]}δ[A 7→τ ]τ ′
Fig. 12: Type Substitution in Source
Terms
()[τ/A] = ()
λx.e[τ/A] = λx.e[τ/A]
...
[e]
δ
τ ′ [τ/A] = [e[τ/A]]
δ[A 7→τ ]
τ ′
〈v〉 = 〈v[τ/A]〉
Fig. 13: Type Substitution in Target
Terms
e  e
Γ is a global parameter
()  () Unit x  [x]·Γ (x)
Var {e}δτ  e
Box
ei  ei
(e1,e2)  (e1,e2)
Pair
e  e
e.i  e.i Proj
e  e
inl e  inl e Inl
e  e
inr e  inr e Inr
e  e ei[{x}·τi/x]  ei
case(e, x : τ1.e1, x : τ2.e2)  case(e, x.e1, x.e2)
Case
e[{x}·τ/x]  e
λx:τ .e  λx.e Abs
ei  ei
e1 e2  e1 e2
App
e  e
ΛA.e  e TAbs
e  e
e τ  e TApp
Fig. 14: Translation
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Cδunit(()) = ()
Cδτ1→τ2(λx.e) = λx:δτ1.{e[Pδτ1(x)/x]}δτ2
Cδτ1×τ2((v1,v2)) = ({v1}δτ1 ,{v2}
δ
τ2
)
Cδτ1+τ2(inl v) = inl {v}δτ1
Cδτ1+τ2(inr v) = inr {v}δτ2
CδA(〈e〉) = e
Cδ∀A.σ(v) = ΛA.Cδσ(v)
Fig. 15: Target to Source Coercion
Cδunit(()) = ()
Cδτ1→τ2(λx:τ .e) = λx.Pδτ2(e[{x}δτ1/x])
Cδτ1×τ2((e1,e2)) = (Pδτ1(e1),Pδτ2(e2))
Cδτ1+τ2(inl e) = inl Pδτ1(e)
Cδτ1+τ2(inr e) = inr Pδτ2(e)
CδA(e) = 〈e〉
Cδτ ′({e}δτ ) = e if τ ≡ τ ′
Fig. 16: Source to Target Coercion
Pδτ (e) =
{
〈e〉 if τ = A
[e]
δ
τ otherwise
Fig. 17: Protect meta-function
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unit ≡ unit def= >
A ≡ B def= >
(τ1,τ2) ≡ (τ ′1,τ ′2) def= τ1 ≡ τ ′1 ∧ τ2 ≡ τ ′2
τ1→τ2 ≡ τ ′1→τ ′2 def= τ1 ≡ τ ′1 ∧ τ2 ≡ τ ′2
τ1+τ2 ≡ τ ′1+τ ′2 def= τ1 ≡ τ ′1 ∧ τ2 ≡ τ ′2
τ ≡ τ ′ def= ⊥ otherwise
Fig. 18: Type equivalence
e  e
()  () Unit x  [x]·Γ (x)
Var {e}δτ  e
Box
ei  ei
(e1,e2)  (e1,e2)
Pair
e  e
e.i  e.i Proj
e  e
inl e  inl e Inl
e  e
inr e  inr e Inr
e  e ei[{x}·τi/x]  ei
case(e, x : τ1.e1, x : τ2.e2)  case(e, x.e1, x.e2)
Case
e[{x}·τ/x]  e
λx:τ .e  λx.e Abs
ei  ei
e1 e2  e1 e2
App
e  e
ΛA.e  e TAbs
e  e
e τ  e TApp
Fig. 19: Translation
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